Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21533
Authors: 
Feess, Eberhard
Muehlheusser, Gerd
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 423
Abstract: 
We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (?Pre-Bosman? or P), currently in use (?Bosman? or B), and recently approved (?Monti? or M) differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club must accept in case of a transfer depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system. Otherwise, regime P is strictly dominated by regime B in terms of expected social welfare. Regime M leads to higher effort but lower incentives to invest in training compared to system B.
Subjects: 
Labor contracts
Bosman judgement
transfer fees
breach of contract
investment incentives
general skills
externalities
JEL: 
L83
K12
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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