Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215265 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12869
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation – rather than its benefits – are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.
Subjects: 
social preferences
charitable giving
excuse-driven behavior
ambiguity
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D64
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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