Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517 
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dc.contributor.authorMariotti, Marcoen
dc.contributor.authorManzini, Paolaen
dc.contributor.authorFella, Giulioen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:23:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:23:07Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x439en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelJ12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keyworddivorceen
dc.subject.keywordnon transferabilityen
dc.subject.stwEherechten
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwScheidungen
dc.titleDoes Divorce Law Matter?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn845016660en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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