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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7993
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a general framework to study contests, containing the well-known models of Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on players' effort and skill, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because a symmetric equilibrium exists under general assumptions regarding production technologies and skill distributions. We construct a link between our contest model and expected utility theory and exploit this link to revisit important comparative statics results of contest theory and show how these can be overturned. Finally, we apply our results to study optimal workforce composition.
Schlagwörter: 
contest theory
symmetric equilibrium
heterogeneity
risk
decision theory
JEL: 
C72
D74
D81
J23
M51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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