Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214995
Authors: 
Bastani, Spencer
Giebe, Thomas
Gürtler, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 7993
Abstract: 
We develop a general framework to study contests, containing the well-known models of Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on players' effort and skill, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because a symmetric equilibrium exists under general assumptions regarding production technologies and skill distributions. We construct a link between our contest model and expected utility theory and exploit this link to revisit important comparative statics results of contest theory and show how these can be overturned. Finally, we apply our results to study optimal workforce composition.
Subjects: 
contest theory
symmetric equilibrium
heterogeneity
risk
decision theory
JEL: 
C72
D74
D81
J23
M51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.