Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21493 
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dc.contributor.authorSchnedler, Wendelinen
dc.contributor.authorSunde, Uween
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:22:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:22:54Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21493-
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently, the agent can improve his future bargaining position, which gives the principalan incentive to retain sufficient control over the agent?s actions. Using respective one-period contracts, the principal can implement the efficient outcome while ?selling the shop? to the agent is sub-optimal. This provides an argument for integration if the boundary of the firm is defined by control rights rather than the entitlement to revenues.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x464en
dc.subject.jelL23en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelL33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordhidden actionen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordendogenous outside optionen
dc.subject.keywordauthorityen
dc.subject.keywordoutsourcingen
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Unternehmungen
dc.subject.stwOrganisationsstrukturen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwOutsourcingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe Hold-Down Problem and the Boundaries of the Firm: Lessons from a Hidden Action Model with Endogenous Outside Option-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn845476343en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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