Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21493
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schnedler, Wendelin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sunde, Uwe | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:22:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:22:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21493 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently, the agent can improve his future bargaining position, which gives the principalan incentive to retain sufficient control over the agent?s actions. Using respective one-period contracts, the principal can implement the efficient outcome while ?selling the shop? to the agent is sub-optimal. This provides an argument for integration if the boundary of the firm is defined by control rights rather than the entitlement to revenues. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x464 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L33 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hidden action | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | endogenous outside option | en |
dc.subject.keyword | authority | en |
dc.subject.keyword | outsourcing | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie der Unternehmung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Organisationsstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollständiger Vertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Outsourcing | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The Hold-Down Problem and the Boundaries of the Firm: Lessons from a Hidden Action Model with Endogenous Outside Option | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 845476343 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.