Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21488
Authors: 
Lalive, Rafael
van Ours, Jan C.
Zweimüller, Josef
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 469
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.
Subjects: 
unemployment duration
benefit sanctions
monitoring
JEL: 
J64
J68
J65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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