Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214541
Authors: 
Stadelmann, David
Portmann, Marco
Eichenberger, Reiner
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2013-17
Abstract: 
We identify the impact of transparency in political decision -making on the quality of political representation with a difference- in-difference strategy. The quality of political representation is measured by observed divergence of parliamentary decisions from revealed voter preferences on the very same issues. Full transparency of votes of individual politicians does not decrease divergence from voter preferences.
Subjects: 
Transparency
quality of political decisions
representation
parliament
individual votes
referenda
JEL: 
D70
D80
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
89.87 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.