Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214539 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2013-15
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Zürich
Abstract: 
The tax compliance literature has mainly focused on individual tax evasion rather than firm tax evasion. In general, there is a lack of field experiments on the topic, and measuring tax compliance is challenging. To address this shortcoming in the literature, we conduct a field experiment on firm tax compliance looking at newly founded firms. As a novelty we explore how firms react to closer supervision by the tax administration, looking at timely paying which has no measurement biases. Interestingly, we observe a crowding-out effect of supervision on timely paying of taxes. On the other hand, for those who were non-compliant, supervision reduced the tax amount that was due.
Subjects: 
tax compliance
tax evasion
field experiment
deterrence
tax enforcement
supervision
JEL: 
H26
C93
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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