Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214536 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2013-12
Verlag: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Zürich
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare the votes of parliamentary representatives and their constituents on a popular initiative that directly aimed at weakening the separation of powers in 1922 in Switzerland. We analyze whether the strength of individual ties to the public service affect the probability of voting for the initiative , holding constituents' preferences constant. Our results indicate that while politicians tend to represent their constituents' preferences, representatives with ties to the public service have a higher probability of supporting the eligibility of public servants for the legislature. Thus, they favor reducing the separation of powers between legislature and administration.
Schlagwörter: 
separation of powers
administration
public servants
legislative voting
constituents' preferences
JEL: 
D72
D73
H83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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