Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214536
Authors: 
Stadelmann, David
Eichenberger, Reiner
Portmann, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2013-12
Abstract: 
We compare the votes of parliamentary representatives and their constituents on a popular initiative that directly aimed at weakening the separation of powers in 1922 in Switzerland. We analyze whether the strength of individual ties to the public service affect the probability of voting for the initiative , holding constituents' preferences constant. Our results indicate that while politicians tend to represent their constituents' preferences, representatives with ties to the public service have a higher probability of supporting the eligibility of public servants for the legislature. Thus, they favor reducing the separation of powers between legislature and administration.
Subjects: 
separation of powers
administration
public servants
legislative voting
constituents' preferences
JEL: 
D72
D73
H83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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