Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214499
Authors: 
Stadelmann, David
Portmann, Marco
Eichenberger, Reiner
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2011-15
Abstract: 
We match individual senators' voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referenda decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model's quality with revealed constituents' preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6 percentage points more than random voting and a senator's probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4 percentage points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.
Subjects: 
Median Voter Model
Political Representation
Constituents' Preferences
JEL: 
D7
H7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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