Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214498
Authors: 
Stadelmann, David
Eichenberger, Reiner
Portmann, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2011-14
Abstract: 
In parliament, individual representatives vote with a certain probability according to their constituents' preferences. Thus, the mechanism of the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be fruitfully applied to parliamentary representation: The probability that a majority of representatives votes according to the preferences of the majority of their constituents increases with the number of representatives per district. The political economy literature has so far disregarded this aspect. We provide a theoretical discussion and quasi-experimental evidence for the validity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem in parliamentary representation by contrasting unique data from parliamentary roll call votes and popular referenda decisions.
Subjects: 
Condorcet Jury Theorem
Preference Aggregation
Voting Behavior
Legislature
Political Representation
JEL: 
D78
D70
D80
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
178.06 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.