Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214497
Authors: 
Kirchgässner, Gebhard
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper 2011-13
Abstract: 
In Switzerland, political concordance or direct popular rights and the resulting consociational democracy are often held responsible for delay or even cancellation of necessary political reforms. Switzerland is, however, not the only country with such a system, and direct democracy is just one out of several mechanisms fostering political concordance. Moreover, as the examples of the United States and Germany show, a concordant political system might show up even if the government does not reflect this. Thus, we first describe different manifestations of political concordance. Then, we ask for institutional preconditions for successful political reforms before the situations in Switzerland and Germany are discussed more detailed. The experience of both countries shows that political concordance is not per se destructive for political reforms, it can even be conductive. This very much depends on the concrete institutional design of political concordance.
Subjects: 
Political Concordance
Consociational Democracy
Divided Government
Economic and Political Reforms
Westminster-System
Germany
Switzerland
JEL: 
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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