Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214419 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2008-25
Verlag: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.
Schlagwörter: 
Assassinations
rational choice
governance
democracy
dictatorship
deterrence
protection
JEL: 
D01
D70
K14
K42
Z10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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