Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214418 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2008-24
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach such as, for example, decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems. Thus, this paper analyses the relationship between local autonomy and tax morale or the size of the shadow economy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland, a country where the degree of federalism varies across different cantons. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).
Subjects: 
Tax Morale
Shadow Economy
Tax Compliance
Tax Evasion
Local Autonomy
Federalism
Institution
JEL: 
H26
H73
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
336.75 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.