Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213445 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 230
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version, December 2019
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.
Schlagwörter: 
Targeted Advertising
Limited Attention
Ad Avoidance
Salience
JEL: 
D43
L13
M37
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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