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Müller, Michael
Puppe, Clemens
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KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 138
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
We study a model in which agents with single-peaked preferences can participate in a costly voting procedure to determine the value of a one-dimensional variable. We show that, for all positive participation cost and all profiles of individual preferences, there exists a (generically) unique equilibrium with (at most) one single participant whenever the voting mechanism is strategy-proof, anonymous, and responsive in the sense that the outcome reacts to a unanimous move of the votes of all agents in the same direction.
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Working Paper

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