Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21321
Authors: 
Kessing, Sebastian G.
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1545
Abstract: 
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to non-welfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.
Subjects: 
optimal income taxation
labor unions
work hours
JEL: 
H23
H21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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