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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNitzan, Shmuelen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as anoutcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor andthose against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of thetwo interest groups under random behavior of the government, with and without lobbying.The paper proceeds with the examination of the effect of government intervention in theproposal of the quota on its nature, assuming that, with and without government intervention,the uncertain approval of the proposal is the outcome of a lobbying contest between the twointerest groups. Finally, we examine the effect that the status-quo policy has on the proposedgovernment's policy.en_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1533en_US
dc.subject.keywordmigration quotaen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment interventionen_US
dc.titleThe Struggle over Migration Policyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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