Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21309 
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en
dc.contributor.authorNitzan, Shmuelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:21:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:21:16Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21309-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as anoutcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor andthose against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of thetwo interest groups under random behavior of the government, with and without lobbying.The paper proceeds with the examination of the effect of government intervention in theproposal of the quota on its nature, assuming that, with and without government intervention,the uncertain approval of the proposal is the outcome of a lobbying contest between the twointerest groups. Finally, we examine the effect that the status-quo policy has on the proposedgovernment's policy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1533en
dc.subject.jelJ81en
dc.subject.jelJ61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmigration quotaen
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen
dc.subject.keywordgovernment interventionen
dc.titleThe Struggle over Migration Policy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn483141283en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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