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dc.contributor.authorvan den Berg, Bernarden_US
dc.contributor.authorHassink, Wolter H.J.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper tests empirically for ex-post moral hazard in a system based on demand-sidesubsidies. In the Netherlands, demand-side subsidies were introduced in 1996. Clientsreceive a cash benefit to purchase the type of home care (housework, personal care, supportwith mobility, organisational tasks or social support) they need from the care supplier of theirchoice (private care provider, regular care agency, commercial care agency or paid informalcare provider). Furthermore, they negotiate with the care supplier about price and quantity.Our main findings are the following. 1) The component of the cash benefit a client has noresidual claimant on, has a positive impact on the price of care. 2) In contrast, thecomponents of the cash benefit a client has residual claimant on, have no or a negativeimpact on the price of care. Both results point at the existence of ex-post moral hazard in asystem of demand-side subsidies.en_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1532en_US
dc.subject.keywordlong-term careen_US
dc.subject.keywordcash benefitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordconsumer directed servicesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddemand-side subsidiesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddirect paymentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.titleMoral Hazard and Cash Benefits in Long-Term Home Careen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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