Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/213056
Authors: 
Croonenbroeck, Carsten
Odening, Martin
Hüttel, Silke
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
FORLand-Working Paper No. 02 (2018)
Abstract: 
Within this paper, we aim to investigate asymmetries among bidders in land auctions that may entail non-competitive prices. Using representative data for Eastern Germany including winning bids, bidder characteristics, and land amenities, we pursue a structural approach to derive distributions of latent land values for different bidder groups. By applying nonparametric techniques, we cannot find evidence for asymmetric bidder structures while differentiating between legal entities, tenancy status, and nationality of bidders. Our findings challenge the hypothesis that land privatization via auctions discriminates against certain buyer groups - an argument that is often used to justify stricter regulation of agricultural land markets.
Subjects: 
First-Price Sealed Bid Land Auctions
Structural Estimation
Buyer Heterogeneity
JEL: 
C57
D44
Q12
Q15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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