Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212918 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 10/2019
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on within-bank variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance, we demonstrate for private, domestic banks that larger declines in market discipline generate larger increases in traditional measures of risk. These results hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime does not change, serve as a control.
Schlagwörter: 
deposit insurance
market discipline
moral hazard
risk taking
banks
Russia
JEL: 
E65
G21
G28
P34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-952-323-275-4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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