Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212784 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 29/2013
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
The interbank market plays an important role in the overall function of the financial system. The efficiency of the interbank market, in turn, depends largely on its inherent disciplining mechanisms. This paper investigates the discipline mechanisms of Russia's interbank market, testing the hypothesis that market discipline in Russia was strong enough to constrain excessive risk-taking by participating banks before, during, and after the 2008- 2009 financial crisis. The existence of quantity-based market discipline is investigated using Heckman's sample selection model and the efficiency of market discipline is studied with a panel data model. Our approach detects market discipline only during the financial crisis, not before or after. Even during the crisis, its efficiency in curbing bank risk-taking was rather low.
Schlagwörter: 
market discipline
interbank market
risk-taking
banks
Russia
JEL: 
G21
G01
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-952-6699-53-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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