Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/212761
Authors: 
Disli, Mustafa
Schoors, Koen
Meir, Jos
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 6/2013
Abstract: 
We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician's party is currently in power - less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them.
Subjects: 
Depositor discipline
political connections
banks
JEL: 
G1
G2
D7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-952-6699-05-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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