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dc.contributor.authorAlbrecht, Jamesen
dc.contributor.authorvan Ours, Jan C.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:20:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:20:49Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers useeducation as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less isotherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lowereducational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, sowe conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x399en
dc.subject.jelI20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRecruitmenten
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen
dc.titleUsing Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn844742430en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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