Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 399
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.
Subjects: 
Recruitment
signaling
JEL: 
I20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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