Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212585 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 13/2006
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998.Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak.We estimate the deposit supply function and show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction.These findings are consistent with depositors interpreting the deposit rate itself as a complementary proxy of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk.
Schlagwörter: 
market discipline
deposit market
transition
Russia
JEL: 
G21
O16
P2
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
952-462-834-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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