Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/212585
Authors: 
Karas, Alexei
Pyle, William
Schoors, Koen
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 13/2006
Abstract: 
Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998.Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak.We estimate the deposit supply function and show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction.These findings are consistent with depositors interpreting the deposit rate itself as a complementary proxy of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk.
Subjects: 
market discipline
deposit market
transition
Russia
JEL: 
G21
O16
P2
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
952-462-834-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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