Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21255
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dc.contributor.authorShields, Michael A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPrice, Stephen Wheatleyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:20:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:20:47Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21255-
dc.description.abstractWe study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders thatenjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this thirdparty involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder tomake contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency.However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is betterfor the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to thetendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x395en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic sectoren_US
dc.subject.keywordstakeholdersen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrikesen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabour relationsen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Diensten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwStreiken_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwStakeholderen_US
dc.subject.stwFirmentarifvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStakeholders, Bargaining and Strikesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn844720720en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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