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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21255
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Shields, Michael A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Price, Stephen Wheatley | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:20:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:20:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21255 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders thatenjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this thirdparty involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder tomake contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency.However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is betterfor the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to thetendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x395 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public sector | en |
dc.subject.keyword | stakeholders | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strikes | en |
dc.subject.keyword | labour relations | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentlicher Dienst | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Streik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Stakeholder | en |
dc.subject.stw | Firmentarifvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 844720720 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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