Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212559 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 7/2005
Publisher: 
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Helsinki
Abstract: 
The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not raditional to a central bank.In addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector.It is currently overssing the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and is the main owner of Russia's largest commercial bank, Sberbank.As this additional functions may conflict with the CBR policy objectives, I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank prescribed in the literature.I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory body within the CBR.Using a simple Taylor rule framework I find that the CBR does not use its "hands-on" supervisory information to maintain financial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned banks' balances.
Subjects: 
Central Bank
Prudential Regulation and Supervision
Monetary Policy Rules
Russia
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
952-462-780-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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