Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21242
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dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:20:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:20:40Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21242-
dc.description.abstractIn a unionised labour market, a substitution of a payroll for an income tax will not alteremployment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, if workers or firms can evade taxes thisirrelevance result might no longer apply. This will especially be the case if the fine for taxevasion depends on undeclared income or on wage payments or if withholding regulationsprevent optimal evasion choices. In such instances, tax evasion opportunities make the legalincidence of taxes an important determinant of their economic incidence and employmentcan rise with a substitution of an income for a payroll tax.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x382en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelJ51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEconomic incidenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegal incidenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordpenaltyen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade unionen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGewerkschaften_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTax Evasion in a Unionised Economyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn844212148en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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