Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21242 
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dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszloen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:20:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:20:40Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21242-
dc.description.abstractIn a unionised labour market, a substitution of a payroll for an income tax will not alteremployment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, if workers or firms can evade taxes thisirrelevance result might no longer apply. This will especially be the case if the fine for taxevasion depends on undeclared income or on wage payments or if withholding regulationsprevent optimal evasion choices. In such instances, tax evasion opportunities make the legalincidence of taxes an important determinant of their economic incidence and employmentcan rise with a substitution of an income for a payroll tax.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x382en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelJ64en
dc.subject.jelH22en
dc.subject.jelJ51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEconomic incidenceen
dc.subject.keywordlegal incidenceen
dc.subject.keywordpenaltyen
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordtrade unionen
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwLohnsteueren
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGewerkschaften
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTax Evasion in a Unionised Economy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn844212148en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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