Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212211 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers No. 8/2012
Publisher: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders that are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch auction produces more revenue than the first price auction.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-952-462-791-7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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