Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212164 
more recent Version: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers No. 7/2010
Publisher: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-952-462-589-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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