Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212009 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers No. 11/2005
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a model depicting cross-border payment systems as a mixed oligopoly.A private net settlement system that maximises profit competes with the central banks' gross settlement system that maximises welfare.It may be optimal for the central bank system to encourage increased use of the private system by charging fees that exceed the marginal cost.The central bank system is not only a competitor but also an essential service provider, because central bank money is needed for net settlement of payments in the private system.In some cases the central bank system can paradoxically induce the private system to charge lower fees by making it expensive to use central bank money for settlement purposes.
Schlagwörter: 
payment systems
network economics
mixed oligopolies
JEL: 
L13
L44
F36
G29
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
952-462-212-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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