Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21184 
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorSchutzler, Arminen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:20:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:20:10Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21184-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of theirworkers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general humancapital, then make wage offers for each others? trained employees and finally engage inimperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multipleequilibria can emerge. If competition is sufficiently soft and trained workers are substitutes,firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwisesuffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trainedworkers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focalequilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x327en
dc.subject.jelL43en
dc.subject.jelL92en
dc.subject.jelD42en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordGeneral trainingen
dc.subject.keywordhuman capitalen
dc.subject.keywordoligopolyen
dc.subject.keywordturnoveren
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Bildungsarbeiten
dc.subject.stwBildungsinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwLohnen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA Product Market Theory of Worker Training-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn843984767en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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