Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21156 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 302
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider various extensions such as intertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-aversion, and ?fuzziness? in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.
Subjects: 
Amnesty
immigration
illegal immigration
border controls
internal controls
JEL: 
H59
J68
J61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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