Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/211491 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences No. 15-2019
Publisher: 
Universität Hohenheim, Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Stuttgart
Abstract: 
This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.
Subjects: 
Partial Collusion
Tacit Collusion
Mergers
Coordinated Effects
Non-coordinated Effects
Umbrella Effects
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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