Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/211343 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 2392
Publisher: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Abstract (Translated): 
The design of the Bolsa Família Program (BFP) provides for the possibility of integrating state and municipal conditional cash transfers, based on the establishment of terms of cooperation with the Federal Government (or "pacts", as these instruments became known). The work systematizes the history of the PBF state pacts, implemented in the context of the Brasil sem Miséria Plan (BSM) - from 2011 - examining how much the changes in the program design, especially the creation of the Benefício para Superação da Extrema Pobreza (BSP), affected the use of this instrument of federative coordination, highlighting its limits and potentialities as a national strategy for coping with poverty. The advent of the BSP contributed to the decline of the pacts agenda, as it changed the federal government's strategy of financial support to overcome the extreme poverty gap on the part of the states for its resolution by the Union itself: that is, the The Union has, on its own, ensure that extreme poverty is overcome according to the national line defined for the BFP. This decision also equated the lack of effectiveness of the instrument of agreement in the induction of the state governments for that purpose. Regarding the limits of the agreements, it was identified difficulties of states with greater proportion of poverty to make financial contributions more robust; the volatility of political interests and the fluctuation of the theme in the state agenda; the low state capacity to act in a countercyclical manner and the fragility of the legal instrument mobilized to manage the pacts between federative entities. On the other hand, it was also possible to find in the pacts an experimental space for adjustments in the design of the programs, which in turn lead to the improvement of the PBF itself, since it has a unique design for the whole country and should be adapted to the different local realities so that it is better able to reach its objectives.
Subjects: 
Bolsa Família
Brasil sem Miséria
conditional cash transfers
federative coordination
JEL: 
I38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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