Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/211232
Authors: 
Reinsberg, Bernhard
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2019/4
Abstract: 
In recent years, donor countries have increasingly used different aid allocation channels to boost aid effectiveness. One delivery channel that has grown tremendously is "multi-bi aid" - contributions to multilateral organizations earmarked for specific development purposes. This article examines whether donors use multi-bi aid to further their selfish goals - specifically, to garner political support for their ambition to become a temporary member of the UN Security Council. In this context, multi-bi aid is particularly beneficial to countries with limited experience as foreign aid donors; whose governance quality is weak; and which are more internationalized. Using a sample of OECD/DAC donor countries in 1995-2016, time-series cross-section analysis corroborates these arguments. The analysis draws on a new dataset of media reports proxying for donor interest in winning a temporary seat in the UN Security Council and extended data on multi-bi aid flows. The findings demonstrate that multi-bi aid may be a tool for geopolitical influence, with yet unexplored consequences for aid effectiveness.
Subjects: 
donor interest
earmarked funding
foreign aid
multi-bi aid
UN Security Council
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-638-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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