Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210891
Authors: 
Horn, Henrik
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 1250
Abstract: 
International investment agreements have become increasingly controversial. The agreements are alleged to be beset with a large number of deficiencies that harm host countries in particular. For instance, they are said to cause "regulatory chill", to distorts investment patterns, and to lead to excessive litigation due to the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms they almost invariably contain. Many of the issues brought up in this debate have evident economic aspects. But until recently there has been very little economic literature on the driving forces behind these agreements, on their appropriate design, and on their effects. There is a nascent theoretical literature on investment agreements and regulatory expropriations, however. This literature is still very much in its infancy. The purpose of this note is to explain in non-technical terms some observations that emerge from this early literature.
Subjects: 
International investment agreements
Regulatory chill
Expropriation
ISDS
JEL: 
F21
F23
F53
K33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
338.12 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.