Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/210881 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ESRB Working Paper Series No. 106
Verlag: 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Do politics matter for macroprudential policy? I show that changes to macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically less likely to be tightened before elections during credit booms and economic expansions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain or in countries where political interference is more likely. In contrast to monetary policy, I find limited evidence that central banks are uniquely insulated from political cycles in macroprudential policy. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to "lean against the wind."
Schlagwörter: 
macroprudential regulation
electoral cycles
regulatory cycles
political economy
central bank independence
JEL: 
G18
G21
G28
D72
D73
P16
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9472-120-4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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