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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013/21
Verlag: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Most theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality, central banks play complex, long-horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these issues in a simple infinite-horizon game with a novel tradeoff: higher rates deter financial imbalances, but lower rates reduce the likelihood of insolvency. We term these factors discipline and stability effects, respectively. The central bank's welfare decreases with dependence between real and financial shocks, so it may reduce costs with correlation-indexed securities. In our model, independent central banks cannot in general attain both low inflation and financial stability.
Schlagwörter: 
central bank
correlation-indexed security
discipline effect
stability effect
JEL: 
E50
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-82-7553-774-2
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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