Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21001 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 159
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
Schlagwörter: 
Preemptive behavior
rank-order tournaments
sequential tournaments
JEL: 
J31
J33
J41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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