Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210017
Authors: 
Karapetyan, Artashes
Stacescu, Bogdan
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2012/18
Publisher: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Abstract: 
Lending is often associated with significant asymmetric information issues between suppliers of funds and their potential borrowers. Banks can screen their borrowers, or can require them to post collateral in order to select creditworthy projects. We find that the potential for longer-term relationships increases banks' preference for screening. This is because posting collateral only provides the information that the current project of a given borrower is of good quality, whereas screening provides information that can be used in evaluating future projects as well as the current ones.
Subjects: 
collateral
screening
bank relationships
JEL: 
G21
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-82-7553-706-3
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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