Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/209934 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2009/18
Publisher: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Abstract: 
The Norwegian experiences of the past thirty years illustrate what we believe are two general tendencies in bank regulation. The first one is that a bank crisis will tend to focus regulators' minds and lead to stricter regulations. The second one is that cycles in regulation tend to interact with the economic cycle, in the sense that the rationale for strong regulation tends to become somewhat blurred when the economy is booming. These patterns appear in the Norwegian experience after the banking crisis of 1988-92, and they can presumably also be recognized in many other jurisdictions.
Subjects: 
Basel I & II
banking crises
history of bank regulation
capital adequacy
JEL: 
G28
N44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-82-7553-523-6
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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