Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/209923
Authors: 
Natvik, Gisle James
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2009/07
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a framework where policymakers decide how to spend public resources on physical capital and labor in order to produce two public goods. Candidate policymakers disagree about which goods to produce, and may alternate in office due to elections. When capital and labor are complementary inputs to the production of public goods, the anticipation of political turnover reduces public savings in physical capital rather than financial assets. Political turnover renders the stock of physical capital for public production too low and inefficiently combined with labor.
Subjects: 
political economics
budget deficits
public investment
JEL: 
E6
H4
H54
H6
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-82-7553-497-0
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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