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Autoren: 
Ben-Haim, Yakov
Akram, Q. Farooq
Eitrheim, Øyvind
Datum: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2007/6
Zusammenfassung: 
We study monetary policy under uncertainty. A policy which ameliorates a worst case may differ from a policy which maximizes robustness and satisfices the performance. The former strategy is min-maxing and the latter strategy is robust-satisficing. We show an "observational equivalence" between robust-satisficing and min-maxing. However, there remains a "behavioral difference" between robust-satisficing and min-maxing. Policy makers often wish to respect specified bounds on target variables. The robust-satisficing policy can be more (and is never less) robust, and hence more dependable, than the min-max policy. We illustrate this in an empirical example where monetary policy making amounts to selecting the coefficients of a Taylor-type interest rate rule, subject to uncertainty in the persistence of shocks to inflation.
Schlagwörter: 
Knightian uncertainty
robustness
info-gap decision theory
monetary policy
min-max policy
robust-satisficing policy
JEL: 
E52
E58
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-82-7553-398-0
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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