Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/209724 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Econometrica [ISSN:] 1468-0262 [Volume:] 86 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Oxford [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 173-217
Verlag: 
Wiley, Oxford
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile, and (ii) the set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characterization, I establish that a weak notion of present bias—implied, for example, by any hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting—is sufficient for equilibrium to be unique, stationary, and efficient. Conversely, I demonstrate how certain violations of present bias give rise to multiple (non-stationary) equilibria that feature delayed agreement under gradually increasing offers.
Schlagwörter: 
time preferences
dynamic inconsistency
alternating offers
bargaining
optimal punishments
delay
DOI der veröffentlichten Version: 
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.