Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208503
Authors: 
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 10-2005
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
Subjects: 
Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions
taxes
MNEs
JEL: 
F23
H25
L23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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